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Elusive Peace: A Comparative Analysis of Civil Wars and
Conflict Resolution in El Salvador and Colombia

Jessica Bryant
(Under the direction of Dr. Oliver Dinius)

Abstract

This study compares the historical contexts ofthe rise of civil wars and their modem
trajectories in Colombia and El Salvador. Through an analysis of the successful
negotiation of peace in the Salvadoran case via a United Nations peacekeeping mission, it
makes conclusions about the relevancy of such an operation for obtaining peace in
Colombia. After a brief discussion of the United Nations evolving peacekeeping mandate
and recent literature about this type of peace negotiation, this thesis examines each
country’s history and its war’s termination (in the case of El Salvador) and
transformation (in the case of Colombia). Recent literature supports multi-dimensional
peacekeeping operations undertaken by organizations such as the United Nations and
uses El Salvador as a model for the successful implementation of such missions. This
study concludes that such an outlook is too optimistic and that particular historicalpolitical factors played a larger role in achieving peace in El Salvador which do not exist
in Colombia. Furthermore, there are several major obstacles with which the United
Nations has never contended but that it would have to confront in developing a
peacekeeping mandate for Colombia
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Introduction
The end to El Salvador’s twelve year civil war was successfully negotiated in
January 1992 during a series of meetings led by a United Nations peacekeeping mission.
A revolution that claimed an estimated 75,000 lives, involved an insurgent group of more
than 12,000 members, and sought reforms that would alter the foundations of Salvadoran
society ended peacefully with a cease fire that has not been broken. Only a decade later,
the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (Farabundo Marti Front for
National Liberation, FMLN), former guerrillas and the most powerful challenge to the
state during the revolution, became the country’s second largest political party to
participate in electoral politics, consolidating what UN Secretary General Boutros
Boutros-Ghali called, “a revolution achieved by negotiation”.*
Colombia, on the other hand, still suffers from a war that originated with
revolutionary guerilla struggles in the mid-sixties. Colombia’s largest guerrilla group, the
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia, FARC), is estimated to have between 12,000 and 18,000 members and
maintains the support of close to one million campesinos dependent on coca cultivation.
Revived by funds extracted from illicit cultivation, the FARC became more active than
ever in the 1990s. The effects of the war are devastating. Guerrilla presence m the

'Charles Call,“Assessing El Salvador’s Transition from Civil War to Peace , in Ending Civil Pfars, ed
Cousens, Rothchild, and Stedmaa (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002). 71
“ Council on Foreign Relations,“FARC,ELN,and AUC”. http://www.cfr.Qrg/publicatioiV9272/M
(Accessed February 20, 2007).
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countryside prevents the historically weak state from establishing rule of law. Since 2002
alone, the conflict displaced three million people.^ The spillover effects of the war
destabilize border areas of Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Brazil.
Recent literature on peacekeeping shows that peace negotiations undertaken by an
international actor with the ability to adopt a multi-dimensional role in the process are
successful. The case of El Salvador is hailed as a shining example ofjust how successful
these types of negotiations are. In addition to successfully disarming and demobilizing
thousands of insurgents, the Salvadoran peace accords affected sweeping institutional
reforms and created a political space in which former revolutionaries could address the
grievances that previously caused them to take up arms. The mission’s greatest challenge
was the restructuring of the country’s armed forces, a group whose hegemony and
repressive measures fomented the insurgency. In Colombia, a UN peacekeeping mission
would have to contend with very different conditions (the least of which being the
country’s booming drug trade) and its mandate would reflect those challenges.
This thesis will use the example of El Salvador’s negotiated peace to make conclusions
about the current chances for ending Colombia’s civil war and suggest the necessary
elements of a peace process there.
Despite the overwhelming support for multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations
in recent literature and the success ofjust such a mission in El Salvador, there has been
no successful attempt at a similar process in Colombia. In a departure from the literature
on conflict resolution, one could hypothesize that the country-specific historical
conditions before and during the conflict made a peaceful resolution more or less likely.

^ Human Rights Watch,“Colombia: Dislaced and Discarded”, 2005.
http://hrw.org/reports/2005/colombia 1005/.
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In our concrete case, such an interpretation would hold that the political history of El
Salvador made peace there more easily achievable than the political history in Colombia.
To try to explain the persistence of conflict, this thesis explores the contemporary history
of both El Salvador and Colombia with respect to the origins of the civil conflict, the rise
of the insurgency, and the conflict’s conclusion (for El Salvador) and transformation (for
Colombia).
Chapter one discusses the historical context of each country’s civil war and the
rise of its insurgency. Both elements are important when trying to understand the specific
components necessary in peace negotiations. While the prescription of a United Nations
peacekeeping mission may be the same for all civil wars, each mission s mandate must
be modified to fit the country. This chapter shows that conditions institutionalized as
early as the turn of the twentieth century became catalysts for the outbreak of civil war in
both El Salvador and Colombia.
Chapter two analyzes the events of the civil war

after the consolidation of

revolutionary forces and, in the case of El Salvador, how the conflict came to an end.
While the historical factors that led to civil wars in each country tell us much about how
the conflict can be negotiated, the circumstances and consequences of the actual fighting
must be investigated to determine what challenges a peacekeeping mission faces. In El
Salvador, a 12,000-strong insurgent group had to be demobilized and the country’s
population was forced to attempt reconciliation after twelve years of bitter fighting. For
Colombia’s part, in addition to the issues of demobilization and reconciliation, the
structural instability created by the war has led to the growth of narcotratficking, an issue
integral to any discussion of the possibilities of peace for the country.
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Chapter three explains how the ways in which peace was successfully negotiated
in El Salvador are and are not relevant to a similar process in Colombia. While many
specific elements of ONUSAL’s mandate (United Nations Observer Mission in El
Salvador) provide important lessons for Colombia, the particular circumstances in which
they were implemented were unique to El Salvador at the end of the 1980s and, to a great
extent, explain the mission’s success. It argues that the present situation in Colombia
prevents similar success on the part of the United Nations. The country’s forty year
history of failure to end the conflict, narcotrafficking boom, and thoroughly entrenched
insurgency create challenges that were not present in El Salvador.

I
Negotiated Settlements to Intrastate Conflicts: Recent Literature

The origins of these two conflicts are disparate and complex, but certainly the
most important difference is that the conflict in El Salvador came to an end with the help
of a United Nations Peace Mission. Recent studies argue strongly that third party
intervention on the part of an international actor such as the United Nations is the only
option for successful civil conflict termination. This thesis will investigate the validity of
these claims by comparing El Salvador, a country in which this conclusion has proven
true, with Colombia, a country that may or may not benefit from this type of intervention.
The following is a brief discussion of the evolving role of the United Nations in civil
conflicts and a review of recent peacekeeping literature.

9

Since the end of the Cold War, the majority of the world’s armed conflicts have
been between intrastate actors."* As a result, the United Nations has seen a shift in its
policies with respect to conflict resolution. The organization’s traditional peacekeeping
involved stationing its troops on borders or in particularly weak areas of States
negotiating the end to interstate conflicts. Maintenance of each party’s sovereignty was
paramount and mediation was the extent of the organization’s commitment.^ After the
end of the Cold War and with the rising occurrence of internal conflicts, the United
Nations began formulating an interventionist and multi-dimensional strategy for
peacekeeping. The Secretary General and Security Council’s evolving interpretation of
Chapters VI and VII of the UN charter reaffirmed the organization’s commitment both to
peace keeping operations of a much more complex nature and to the right of UN troops to
use force in self-defense or to defend the mission’s chief goals.^ In 1995, Secretary
General Boutros-Ghali identified the United Nation’s new peacekeeping responsibilities
as.
the supervision of cease-fires, the regroupment and demobilization of forces, their reintegration
into civilian life and the destruction of their weapons; the design and implementation of de-mmmg
programmes; the return of refugees and displaced persons; the provision of humanitarian
assistance; the supervision of existing administrative structures; the establishment o new po ice
forces; the verification of respect for human rights; the design and supervision of constitutional
judicial and electoral reforms; the observation, supervision and even organization and conduct of
elections; and the coordination of support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.

^ Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sanibanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace
Operations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 6
^ Ibid, 7
^ Ibid, II
’Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Supplement to "An Agendafor Peace Position Paper ofthe Sea etan eriet a
on the Occasion ofthe Fiftieth Anniversary ofthe United Nations, A/50/60; S/1991/1. January 3, 1
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In just three years, between 1987 and 1994, the organization’s peacekeeping budget
increased from $230 million to $3.6 billion, three times its regular operating budget.^
The literature supporting the effectiveness of third-party or international
intervention in the termination of internal conflicts is extensive. Michael Doyle and
Nicholas Sambanis are the most enthusiastic supporters of UN peace missions. Based on
quantitative studies of all civil wars since 1945, they argue that the success of achieving
sustainable peace (defined as both a “negative peace” in which the State’s monopoly on
violence is restored and a “positive” peace which includes a broader consolidation of
peace) is dependent on international intervention, specifically the type which only the UN
is committed to providing.^ They conclude that the political space for successful
negotiations is defined by the level of hostility in the country (measured by things such as
the number of casualties, refugees, and the type of conflict), the local capacity (both
democratic and economic), and the willingness or ability of the international community
10

to make up for the lack of the first two elements.
Using a similar dataset from J. David Singer and Melvin Small s project on
Correlates of War, Beverly Walter finds that the “critical barrier” to conflict resolution
resides in the lack of credible guarantees that parties can make to one another during
negotiations. The barrier derives from the complete vulnerability that a peace process
demands of insurgent groups: “At a time when no legal institutions exist to enforce a

^ Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, Making War and Building Peace: United Nations Peace
Operations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006). 6
^ Ibid, 64
Ibid, 339
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contract, they are asked to demobilize, disarm, and disengage their military forces and
prepare for peace”.'* She concludes,
groups fighting civil wars almost always chose to fight to the finish unless an outside power
stepped in to guarantee a peace agreement. If a third party agreed to enforce the terms of a peace
treaty, negotiations almost always succeeded regardless of the initial goa^ls, ideology, or ethnicity
of participants. If a third party did not intervene, these talks usually failed.’"

In Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America, Cynthia Amson looks at six
cases of internal armed conflict in Latin America: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Colombia, Peru, and the state of Chiapas in Mexico. In an attempt to discern those things
which facilitated or impeded the peace processes in each case, Amson comes to a similar
conclusion, “the role of the international community, through such institutions as the
13

United Nations...has been essential to the conclusion of peace agreements,

Her theory

of negotiations emphasized the primacy of perceptions (the insurgent’s perception of
government’s willingness to negotiation and their commitment to the process and vice
versa) over objective conditions which, “leaves open the possibility that ripe moments
14

(for peace) can be created and orchestrated”.
Patrick M. Regan and Fen Osier Hampson find that mediation on the part of a
multinational authority is essential both because it facilitates open communication and
15

encourages agreement by “changing the costs and benefits of cooperation respectively.
Hampson looks at the post-conflict conditions in Cyprus, Namibia, Angola, Cambodia,
and El Salvador and concludes that the countries which have the highest possibility of

Beverly Walter,“The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement International Organizations 5 \( 1997).
336_i
Ibid, 336
13

Cynthia J. Amson, Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America (Washington D.C.. Woodrow
Wilson Center Press, 1999). 9
'"Ibid, 451
Fen Osier Hampson, Nurturing Peace(Washington D. C.: US Institute of Peace, 1996). and Patrick M.
Regan, Civil Wars and Foreign Powers(Michigan: Michigan University Press, 2000).
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maintaining peace were the ones in which third-party actors were extensively involved in
negotiations and implementation of agreements.
The proponents of multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations undertaken by
international actors such as the United Nations base their conclusions on case studies in
which those types of operations were successful. El Salvador is one such case. Contrary
to the conclusions of the works mentioned above, however, this thesis argues that the
successful negotiation of the Salvadoran peace was facilitated by the country’s particular
historical context. As a result, the prescription of a similar process to Colombia will not
necessarily see the same success.

13

1
The Origins of War: Institutionalized Sources of Discontent in El
Salvador and Colombia
The peacekeeping literature reviewed above minimizes the significance of the
particular histories of countries involved in civil conflicts when prescribing a multi
dimensional operation undertaken by an international actor. This thesis contends,
however, that some historical factors may present challenges which threaten the success
of such operations. The following is a discussion of the context of Colombia and El
Salvador’s civil wars. For Colombia, this discussion is centered on the paradoxical nature
of the country’s history. Unlike the military dictatorships and economic crises which
plagued many Latin American countries during the twentieth century, Colombia
maintained a nominal democracy and a presidentialist tradition. The country also
experienced an average 5% growth rate of its economy between 1945 a‘nd 1995 and
16

escaped the 1980s debt crisis and astronomical inflation faced by many countries.

With

the exception of four short years between 1953 and 1957, Colombia has seen the
consistent election of civilian leaders in free elections. The paradox lies in the fact that.
despite the country’s prosperity and institutional stability, it is home to both the world s
longest running civil war and, as of 2001, three organizations

on the U.S. State

Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations, Eduardo Pizarro

Leongomez,

professor at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia and former director of the Institute of

The Economist,“Colombia. Drugs, War, and Democracy”, April 21, 2001. and Kissing^,
America Need a Foreign Policy? Towards a Diplomacyfor the 2f'Centwy.(New York. Simon an

^

Schuster, 2000).
■’ v
a
Eduardo Pizarro, Colombia: Situacion actualyperspectivas futura (Rio de Janeiro: Fundacion onra
Adenauer, 2001). 6
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Political Studies and International Relations, correctly points out that the high levels of
violence in Colombia are due, in large part, to its electoral tradition.’^ As this chapter
attempts to show, the origins of violence in Colombia and the insurgency which arose in
the 1960s have their roots in the country’s two party political system, the outbreak ofLa
Violencia, and the inability of the Colombian government to address the demands of the
emerging insurgency.

I
Nominal Democracy and the Militarization of Politics: The Context of
Colombia’s Civil War
Part of Colombia’s institutional stability stems from its success at maintaining a
strong two party system in which candidates gained office through consistent free
elections, but one must turn a more critical eye towards this process to see its problems
and the way in which it contributed to the link between politics and violence. The
militarization of politics that occurred early on in the country’s history and was
perpetuated by bloody periods such as La Violencia has much to do with the outbreak of
the country’s civil war in the 1960s. While free elections of civilian governments did
occur on a regular basis throughout the 20**’ century, neither national nor municipal
elections were completely free from corrupt election practices such as clientelism.
Frustration was prevalent as conservatives allied with the Catholic Church and
hacendados (owners of large estates) held onto power for nearly fifty years. It was not
until the election of Enrique Olaya Herrerra (1930-1934) that the Liberal Party gained its

Ibid, 7
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first real foothold in Colombian political life. Colombian liberalism was in its early stages
of development at this time and, while members of the extreme left were influenced by
Mexico’s 1917 Constitution and Peru’s social democratic Aprista movement, there was
not much momentum behind the idea of profound social change.
The Liberals of the early 20**^ century favored a decrease in the role of the Church
in education, legalization of divorce, decentralization of government, and limited
government influence in the economy. For the first time in many years, supporters of a
more socially conscious government (one that would attend to the agrarian question or
labor issues, for example) felt that the administration was sympathetic to their concerns.
With respect to changes such as income or land redistribution during the so called
“Liberal Republic” much was left neglected, however, and popular political
representation was almost non-existent. During the previous fifty years of Conservative
rule, worker rights and the agrarian question were non-issues, and while they would be on
the liberal president’s nominal agenda, not much positive change was accomplished.
President Olaya initiated some reforms; he strengthened voting rights and encouraged the
unionization of workers. His successor, Alfonso Lopez Pumarejo (1934-1938) continued
a moderate reform agenda. It was during his tenure that the Colombian Worker s
Federation(CTC)was founded.
By the end of the “Liberal Republic”, the Liberal party’s only real contribution
was the provocation of social turmoil by making superficial changes without ensuring the
implementation of more profound social transformation or popular political
representation. Perpetuated over and over again by administrations from both parties, this
process intensified the perception of dissidents who came to believe that change could
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only be achieved through revolution. The Liberals’ reign in government lasted for 16
more years but the reform agenda fell by the wayside as presidents chose to maintain the
support of moderate party members and the country’s elite. Little was done to answer the
agrarian question that would be so central to the insurgent groups of the 1960s. President
L6pez Pumarejo made significant changes to property laws but only in response to
pressure from international oil companies. According to the new legislation, all land that
was not being utilized would officially come under the control of the State. The
government was slow to act on the new law, however, and many landowners had time to
make the necessary changes to keep their holdings. Arbitration was also nearly non
existent in many rural areas. The rise of Colombian communism in the late ‘30s and early
‘40s caused a panic throughout Colombia’s elite and the CTC was purged by the Liberals
themselves in 1947.
During the Liberal Republic, the Conservatives’ reaction to losing their hegemony
exacerbated the partisan division that caused extreme levels of violence during the
ensuing decades. The Conservatives abstained from elections in 1934, 1938, and 1942.
While they lost control of politics on a national level, they maintained influence in rural
areas where clientelist hacendados were still very powerful and campesinos remained
poor and uneducated. However, by the mid-1940s, the Liberals controlled both houses of
Congress and had succeeded in gaining control of the judiciary and almost all municipal
police forces. In 1946, as a result of divisions within the Liberal party, Luis Mariano
Ospina Perez(1946 - 1950) became the first Conservative president to hold office in two
decades with 41% of the vote. Despite his victory, Ospina Perez would soon be

17

overshadowed by Liberal leader Jorge Eliecer Gaitan, who,“in the last three years of his
life (1945-1948)...was the most influential politician in Colombia”^^.
Gaitan appeared on the scene when Colombia most needed a Liberal capable of
mobilizing the masses with a message they could understand and is important because of
the way in which he galvanized opposition to the government and status quo. More
palatable to the average Colombian than Marxism, Gaitan’s rhetoric was a socialistinspired populism which spoke against the capitalist evils specific to Colombia, namely,
how the country’s oligarchs had been manipulating the people and the economy in their
favor for decades. Sectarian violence was becoming more and more frequent and in
response to two decades of Liberal control and entrenchment, the Conservatives began an
informal campaign of “cleansing” and intimidation through the murder of Liberal
politicians and supporters. Eliecer Gaitan, aware of his precarious position, often told his
followers: “If they kill me, avenge me!”^® His assassination on April 9, 1948, caused an
immediate backlash of rioting known as the bogotazo. It is estimated that over a thousand
people died during the bogotazo’s two days. Surprisingly, the conservative president
Ospina Perez managed to maintain his office as the army soon regained control of the
city and pledged its allegiance to him. In a meeting with Liberals on April 10, Ospina
Perez promised to confront the civil unrest by increasing Liberal representation in his
government. Many in his party, however, did not agree with this solution and municipal
governments ignored his compromise with the Liberals.
The long fought contest between conservatives and liberals emerged in Colombia
as it did during the 19th century in many Latin American countries, namely, as a stmggle
19

Marco Palacios, Between Legitimacy and Violence: A Histoty ofColombia, 1875-2002(Durham; Duke
University Press, 2006). 139
20
Ibid, 140
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between the wealthy elite, the Church and its allies, and anticlerical reformers, but ended
up being the source of bitter violence that left a devastating legacy."’ What had begun as
an organic process in which citizens made a lifelong commitment to one of the two
strongest political parties ended in the institutionalization of what statesman Miguel
„22

Antonio Caro called “hereditary hatreds,

Before Eliecer Gaitan’s death, the sectarian

tensions that had been present for nearly a century had manifested themselves in short
bursts of violence. After his death, those tensions erupted into an all out civil war. This
violent period of Colombia’s history would claim an estimated 300,000 lives and marked
what one historian calls the “militarization of the social polarization”" .
The effects ofLa Violencia, which most historians periodize as occurring between
1945 and 1965, on Colombian society cannot be overstated. This period graphically
demonstrated the fact that, for nearly a century and a half, violence in Colombia had been
used as a tool with which to gain representation during long periods of the opposition
party’s hegemony. During this period, fhistrated political factions formed guerilla groups
and began a systematic violent “cleansing” of members of the opposition party. Gonzalo
Sanchez states.
To note tliat many Colombian children and adolescents between 1949 and 1965 (to establish a
limit that from today’s perspective is arbitrary), that is, an entire generation, were socialized not in
the street, the neighborhood, the family, or school but in the guerilla unit is not simply a trite
commentary on the scope of the entire process.

Guerrilla groups emerged in many rural areas outside of Cundinamarca (the department
in which Bogota is situated) and while political leaders from both parties denied the

David Bushnell, The Making ofModern Colombia: A Nation in Spite ofItself(University of California
Press, 1993).
22
Robert Dix, The Political Dimensions ofChange(New Haven, Connecticut, 1967).
Gonzalo Sanchez, Guerra y politica en la sociedad colomhiana (Bogota, 1991).
24
Ibid, 14-15

19

existence of a civil war, in many cities the violence was comparable to one. Towards the
end of Ospina Perez’s presidency, a large number of recruits for the national police force
were taken from the city of Chulavita, a Conservative stronghold in the department of
Boyaca. Groups of police officers, which became known as chulavitas, began moving
into Liberal cities and establishing their presence in a way that can only be described as
occupation. In addition to Chulavitas, death squads known as pdjaros swept the
countryside employing brutal tactics. In many cases, the wombs of pregnant women were
slashed open and the testicles of men were removed in a symbolic gesture about the
25

procreation of the opposition party.
The violence dropped off sharply after the country’s only

century coup d’etat

during which General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla (1953-1957) came to power. Both Liberals
and Conservatives supported the new military government and his immediate pardon of
those involved in guerrilla activities and initiatives aimed at reconciling the two factions
gained him popular support as well. This opinion shifted only four years later, however,
when Rojas began using oppression to maintain his control over the country. He was
ousted in 1958 by the military and quickly replaced by a civilian government eager for
unity and reconciliation.
Despite the hopeful beginning of Rojas’ regime, Colombia still lacked popular
political representation, and in 1958, with the foundation of the Frente Nacional
(National Front, FN), this deficiency would be institutionalized. The FN was formed as
an answer to the partisan violence wreaking havoc on the country since its independence.
In a declaration signed by fonuer conservative president Laureano Gomez and former
liberal president Alberto Lleras Camargo (1958 - 1962), the two parties agreed to share
Jenny Pearce, Colombia: Inside the Labyrinth (London: Latin American Bureau, 1990).
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power of the presidency by rotating between a candidate from each party every four
years. The rotating presidency and equitable power sharing in all other offices would be
maintained for the next sixteen years but the violence would not stop and the success of
26

politicians was based on elite connections.
During the second phase of La Violencia, a new type of violence emerged which
is eerily familiar when one looks at the evolution of the county’s late 20**^ century
guerrilla groups. This process, which historians refer to as the “mafia-ization” of
violence, had a new goal.^’ The transformation of violence was such that

participants.

“had become socialized to murder as a social instrument during the first phase. Now,
however, the principal aim of organized homicide was not political power but rather
●

«28

economic gam.

In mral areas where the state was nearly non-existent and the

campesino-hacendado conflict still raged, independent armed groups materialized to
provide protection. Soon, both sides were contracting the services of or pledging their
allegiances to one of these groups. These armed units had their roots in the partisan
conflict but maintained as their principal goal their own economic welfare and used such
tactics as extortion to achieve that goal.
The absence of political representation which began as a result of elite control of
government and was later institutionalized by the FN, combined with the firmly
cemented link between politics and violence due to La Violencia, created the conditions
which would lead to the country’s civil war. The bitter sectarian violence in the country
caused war to be seen not as

a perversion of politics but its most efficacious

26

Frank Safford and Marco Palacios, Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society( New York: Oxford,
2002).
27
Ibid, 349
28
Ibid, 351
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«29

instrument.

The rift that divided Colombia’s rural areas prevented the state from

establishing a legitimate presence and the violence that raged across the country caused
the appearance of independent armed groups. The “cleansing” of opposition party
members by death squads caused an unconscious polarization of society that turned
Colombia into what one historian described as

a nation of cities,” independent

municipalities ruled and guarded selfishly by each party’s local oligarchy. It also led to
the migration of an estimated 150,000 people and the displacement within the country of
hundreds of thousands more.^^ The violence also destabilized the country’s justice
system; the Ministry of Justice, established in the midst of the sectarian battles in 1945,
never established legitimacy with either party and as a result neither would turn to it for
the legal adjudication of their conflicts. Meanwhile, Colombia’s elite were still enjoying
the country’s remarkable macroeconomic growth and the socioeconomic divide
continued to grow.

II
Violence Perpetuated: The Rise of the Insurgency in Colombia
The conditions discussed above, including an audacious military maneuver by the
Colombian army, led to the creation of the guerrilla groups which would fight
Colombia’s civil war in the second half of the 20*^ century. During the 1960s, several
, one
armed groups materialized. Originally a reaction to extreme partisan violence
historian explains,
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The same organizations which saved them from being killed by the chulavitas in 1950, which
enabled them to confront the army in 1955, which defended their lives during the marches,
allowed them in the 1960s and 1970s to limit the advance of the latiftmdio/’

Inspired by Guatemala’s October Revolutionaries, Bolivia’s Movimiento Nacionalista
Revolucionaho (National Revolutionary Movement, MNR), and Castro’s successful
revolution in Cuba, Colombia’s insurgent groups drew on Marxist and Leninist teachings
for their ideological foundations. The ability to mobilize campesino masses hinged on the
agrarian question and the state’s historic inability or unwillingness to provide a realistic
answer, two issues addressed by the socialist doctrines the groups adopted. These early
guerrillas hoped to capitalize on the tendency towards armed conflict which evolved
during La Violencia’s most violent periods and saw combat as the only means with which
32

to overcome their marginalized role in Colombian politics.
In the first years of the 1960s, loosely organized self-defense groups emerged to
protect rural campesinos from the country’s large landowners and the liberal-conservative
oligarchy. It was not until 1964, during an operation undertaken by the Colombian
military called Plan Laso that these groups evolved into their more modem manifestation.
Plan Laso was the first real demonstration of the Colombian military’s commitment to
“internal security” and was aimed at a group of insurgent peasants in the valley of
Marquetalia, a stronghold of the group’s leader Manuel Mamlanda. The maneuver, which
included 16,000 troops and an aerial bombardment, regained control of the area for the
Colombian military but very few peasants were killed or captured and the aggressive
tactics used pushed the self defense groups into militancy. Marco Palacios writes, “...this
was, in a sense, the birth of the FARC as a national organization of dispersed and shifting
Historian Alfredo Molano, quoted in Geoff Simona, Colombia: A Brutal Histoiy(London; Saqi, 2004).
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regional “fronts”, which today number over forty.

As a result, what had been a

stationary self-defense group became a mobile insurrection force and evolved into the
world’s oldest guerrilla group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionaria de Colombia
(Revolutionary Armed Forces, FARC), whose slogan remains: “jDesde Marquetalia hasta
la Victoria!
In 1966, at the second conference of the Bloque Sw\ the group officially became
the FARC. Throughout the rest of the 1960s and the 1970s, the FARC gained momentum
and became more and more aggressive. Through prolonged guerrilla warfare the FARC
hoped to overthrow what it considered a repressive government ruled by the Colombian
oligarchy. A central tenet of their ideology was agrarian reform, considered an
“indispensable condition of vertically elevating the level of every carnpesino’s material
and cultural life, liberating them from unemployment, hunger, illiteracy, and the endemic
illnesses that limit their capacity of work; to break the bonds of latifundismo and to
«34

motivate the country’s development of agricultural and industrial production.
Originally closely allied with the Communist Party, during the 1980s, the FARC
distanced itself and developed its own political and military strategy.
A major event in FARC history, one that would engender a profound distrust in a
politically negotiated solution to the conflict occurred when President Belisario Betancur
Cuartas(1982- 1986) legalized the FARC’s political manifestation, the Union Patriotica
(Patriotic Union, UP). The political violence of La Violencia was renewed in one of
Colombia’s bloodiest periods. Nearly 3000 members of the UP were systematically
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assassinated, including three of the party’s candidates for president. This bloody period
increased the FARC’s belief that the only means of achieving the reforms it desired was
through continued warfare.
The Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional (National Liberation Army, ELN) the
second largest guerrilla group in Colombia, differs from the FARC in both its ideological
foundations and the composition of its directorate. While a campesino membership was
present, this group grew mostly from student protests and the majority of its leadership
was comprised of urban intellectuals. While also Marxist-Leninist, the ELN never had
close ties witli the Communist Party but instead followed thefoco theory of Che Guevara.
This theory, which holds that a small, urban based leadership (foco) should establish
revolutionary communities in rural areas to serve as models for the rest of the country, is
less concerned with political action than with the successful consolidation of war with the
state.

In the years directly following the ELN’s foundation, a small group of

intellectuals, peasants, and oil workers traveled to Cuba for training and returned with
new military knowledge and the promise of Cuban assistance. The group’s focus on
warfare made it difficult for it to develop a coherent political reform agenda. Discussions
„35

on the subject in the late sixties, “ended almost always in internal fighting.
This lack of ideology proved discouraging to the ELN’s campesino base. The rural
guerrillas often came into conflict with the “petty bourgeoisie of the city” and the group
saw periodic “cleansings” of members who were considered too distanced from the
36

revolution.
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Colombia’s paramilitaries arose from the same context of violence from which
both the FARC and the ELN did. They began as conservative autodefensas (self-defense
groups) initially devoted to protecting the interests of wealthy hacendados. Although
originally merely a reactionary force, the group’s conservative members sought to protect
the state and “social order” from the threat of communism.^^ These groups owe their
survival and consolidation to the Cold War Doctrine of National Security which focused
on counterinsurgency and the fight against “internal enemies” of the state. Two 1960s
laws encouraged the growth of paramilitaries. Decree 3398 and Law 48 effectively
legalized the formation of ‘self-defense’ groups that would fight against the newly
formed leftist guerrilla groups.^^ The state’s support would continue for several decades
more or less explicitly; in 1982, Minister of Defense General Rafael Samudio explained,
“the civil defense committees of autodefense are legitimate if these communities are
»39

organized to defend their property and their lives.

A turning point in the history of Colombia’s paramilitaries occurred as a result of
the rising power of the country’s narcotraffickers. During this period, the paramilitaries
returned to their reactionary origins; their modem manifestations resulted from a desire to
protect the country’s new cocaine oligarchy from guerrilla groups relying on extortion to
finance themselves. The 1981 kidnapping and murder of Carlos and Fidel Castano’s
father and the kidnapping of Martha Nieves Ochoa, sister of a prominent dmg trafficker,
led to the consolidation of paramilitaries in the department of Antioquia. Muerte a Los
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Secuestradores (Death to Kidnappers), founded by the Ochoa family and a separate
group created by the Castaho brothers received military and logistical support from active
members of the Fuerzas Publicas (Public Forces, the armed forces and police force).
During the 1990s, Carlos Castano created thQ Autodefensas Unidas Colombianas(United
Colombian Self-Defense Group, AUC)in an effort to unite the country’s paramilitaries
and formulate a political agenda which would allow them a place in negotiations to end
the conflict.
***

Colombia’s claim to one of the longest running civilian-led democracies in Latin
America quickly loses its relevance with a deeper investigation of the country’s history.
The militarization of Colombian politics began early in the twentieth century with La
Violencia and was perpetuated during the Union Patriotica massacre. Barriers to popular
representation originated from the oligarchy’s political hegemony and were
institutionalized with the Frente Nacional. These are the most crucial elements in an
understanding of Colombia’s paradox. The inability of the Colombian government to
establish a presence in large areas of the country left a void that was quickly filled by
emerging guerrilla groups that capitalized on the instability created by these factors. As a
result, Colombia finds itself in the midst of a 40 year civil war with no end in sight.
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Ill
The Institutionalization of Inequality: The Context of Revolution in El
Salvador
Just as in Colombia, the story of the revolutionary movement of the 1970s and
80s in El Salvador requires a discussion of developments that have their roots in the late
1800s. While the origins of Colombia’s revolutionary history can be found in the
incestuous link between politics and violence, the ideology behind El Salvador’s
insurgency stems from a century of inequality, agrarian unrest, and the
institutionalization of the military as protector of oligarchic privilege. The country’s
inequities are both social and political. While most Salvadorans experienced extreme
poverty and landlessness, the country’s elites maintained a political system that neither
encouraged nor allowed popular representation or social reform. This section, like the
segment on Colombia, seeks to explore the conditions that led to El Salvador’s civil war
in order to more thoroughly understand how the country successfully negotiated an end to
the conflict.
An analysis of El Salvador’s history shows that the roots of the country’s extreme
inequities, the very ones upon which the socialist insurgency of the 1970s would
capitalize for support, derive from conditions established as far back as 1800s. By the
mid-19*’’ century, coffee had become El Salvador’s main export crop. Wealthy
Salvadoran businessmen, made rich from the country’s previous monocrop, indigo, were
in a strong position to buy up the fertile lands that would be so important in coffee
cultivation. The necessary investment of capital and time for coffee cultivation is
intensive; coffee trees do not begin producing for several years after having been planted
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and require constant care. This investment was impossible for the subsistence farmers or
landless campesinos that made up the majority of the country’s population. It was not
long before a coffee oligarchy had been established and the all too familiar Latin
American story of the chasm between the extremely rich and the desperately poor played
40

out in El Salvador as well.

The country’s small size and large population had made it difficult for coffee
barons to accumulate large tracts of land, but legislation introduced in 1856 and 1881,
proposed as a form of economic liberalization that would generate new revenue for the
country made this process much easier. The first decree required that two-thirds of
communal lands be planted with coffee. The second went even further and abolished the
communal lands altogether."** In 1879, close to 40% of country’s land had been
42

communal and up to 60% of the country’s population may have been dependent on it.
The transition was not easy, as a result, and between 1872 and 1898 there were five
popular uprisings during attempts to remove indigenous populations from their lands.
With the rise of private armies that protected large haciendas, the entrenchment of the
coffee elite in Salvadoran society proceeded apace. The beginning of the long standing
tradition of using the country’s Fuerzas Publicas (Public Forces, the military and
National Police) to control the ever-growing landless population became officially
established when the government consolidated these private protection forces and created
the Rural Police (which would eventually evolve into the National Police) and the
Mounted Police, mandated by decrees in 1884 and 1889. The world financial crisis
40
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triggered by the First World War between 1914 and 1922 provided another opportunity
for the coffee elite to build their economic power as small landholders were bankrupted
and forced to sell their holdings at low prices to the hacendados whose capital base
allowed them to weather the storm.
For the first half of the twentieth century, El Salvador’s government was ruled
directly by the oligarchy. During the first two decades, power was handed off between
two brothers, Carlos and Jorge Melendez, and their brother-in-law Alfonso Quinonez.
Economic liberals, all three worked to open up El Salvador’s markets to further enrich
the elites. In 1927, the brothers chose Pio Romero Bosque as their successor, expecting
him to continue their tradition of liberalism for the benefit of the few. Romero took office
in 1930 in an environment that was rapidly becoming politically charged. The US stock
market crash of 1929 sent coffee prices diving and the landless peasants, now making a
living off wage labor on large haciendas, faced a 50% cut in their pay. Suddenly, the
country’s growing proletariat was feeling more than just discontent and the burgeoning
Partido Comunista Salvadoreiio (Salvadoran Communist Party, PCS)found many people
who were attracted to its doctrines.
There came a time when we were not given land or work, or if there was land, it was of the worst
quality...! had to abandon my wife and children. I did not get enough work to be able to give them
food, still less clothing, or to educate them. I do not know where they are. Misery has separated us
43
forever...For this I became a communist.

A new consciousness was clearly emerging in the countryside: 40 new labor unions had
been created by 1930.
Despite campesino unrest and the oligarchy’s growing concerns about the new
president’s unwillingness to follow their rules, Romero called open elections in 1930. In
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what were “the most open and honest elections in Salvadoran history,

Arturo Araujo

won. Although still a member of the coffee growing elite, Araujo became known for his
worker-friendly attitude. He paid laborers on his hacienda twice the national average and
eventually gained the endorsement of the country’s leftist newspaper,Patria. Despite his
lack of sincere intentions to perform the necessary agricultural reform as evidenced by
his unwillingness to do so during his administration, his election gave the Salvadoran
working class hope that change could be effected through legitimate political action. This
hope was premature, however, because on December 2, 1931, just eight months after
taking office, Araujo was deposed in the first of many twentieth century coups. It had not
taken long for the Salvadoran oligarchy to learn their lesson. The status quo was difficult
for them to both perpetuate and protect at the same time and the solution to this problem
was the institutionalization of the Salvadoran military as the new defender of the
country’s privileged elite. The situation was aptly described by an oligarch in 1980:“We
„45

have traditionally bought the military’s guns and paid them to pull the trigger.
The 1931 coup began the longest unbroken record of conservative military rule in
Latin America and provided a wake-up call to a new, politically conscious leftist
movement. Augustin Farabundo Marti, a member of the young PCS who had spent time
with Augusto Cesar Sandino, Nicaragua’s leftist revolutionary leader, began planning a
coup to overthrow the increasingly repressive military junta. However, the government
discovered the plot days before it could be set into action. After the failed 1932 attempt,
Marti was tried by a military tribunal and executed by a firing squad. The government’s
retribution did not end there: in what would come to be known as La Matanza (The
44
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Massacre), anywhere between 17,000 and 40,000 Salvadorans were hunted down and
killed by government security forces. Death squads hunted down any person in
indigenous dress or with their characteristic physical attributes even though fewer than
10% of those killed had actually participated in the rebellion. The effects of this violent
period were profound: “The matanza so deeply scarred the collective memory of the
peasantry that they virtually abandoned Indian custom and dress and did not attempt to
organize themselves again for three decades.
The consequences of Marti’s failed popular uprising would affect El Salvador in
profound ways that fostered many of the conditions underlying the outbreak of civil war
in 1979. The oligarchy’s dependence on violence as a means of securing and protecting
its power cemented the military’s role in Salvadoran politics.
If before the coup d’etat the political idea that only civilians must serve as president had triumphed
and been consolidated, afterwards the opposite idea was pursued...afterward the entire oligarchy
withdrew from the political game in order to leave it to military tyranny...(the army) was
transfonned, in practice, into the great elector and into a type of political party permanently in
arms'*^.

The harsh repression by the military junta, led by General Maximiliano Hernandez
Martinez(1931 — 1934), caused the fledgling political consciousness of the 1920s to go
underground or disappear entirely. Hernandez outlawed all peasant organizations and
demonstrations and banned any political organizations. The General would continue this
repression in more subtle ways. He created ProPatria, the first manifestation of the
Salvadoran “national party”. He also decentralized decision making in the country and
placed members of the military in important offices at national and local levels. As a
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result of Hernandez’s repressive tactics and ban on political organizations, almost all
visible opposition to the government vanished.
The Hernandez regime established mechanisms that continued to characterize
Salvadoran politics for most of the twentieth century and frustrated the kinds of social
and economic reform that the 1970s insurgency held as its main tenets. The first, and
most obvious, was the institutionalization of the military as the “custodian of Salvadoran
„48

politics.

The second was the use of corruption as a means of keeping conservative

military officers in power. Tommie Sue Montgomery describes the situation as a political
cycle. The cycle occurs as follows. First, there is repression on the part of the
Conservative military regime. This repression leads to the emergence of a dissident,
reformist faction within the army that attempts or is successful in accomplishing a coup.
The new junta gains power for a short time but eventually military violence reestablishes
the conservative hegemony and repression begins again. El Salvador endured this cycle
49

no less than six times during the twentieth century.
This cycle and the repression associated with it was a direct consequence of the
symbiotic relationship between the military and the oligarchy. The link between the two
most powerful sectors of Salvadoran society eliminated any opportunity for the political
representation of opposition parties and allowed conservative governments to ignore
issues such as agrarian reform. A 1944 attempted coup against Hernandez strengthened
the elite’s desire to consolidate its control, led to the declaration of martial law, and
caused an increase in the regime’s repressive measures. In a stunning display of popular
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power, one that provided a glimpse of the capacity for mobilization that the Salvadoran
people would develop in the 1970s, students from the University of El Salvador, labor
activists, and leftist organizers called a general strike that brought the country to a stand
still on May 8, 1944. As a result, Martinez resigned, but not before passing power to his
chosen successor. General Andres Ignacio Menendez (1944 - 1945/°. Menendez
initiated some reforms; he reinstated freedom of the press and named leaders from
several political factions to his cabinet. This proved to be too much for the oligarchy. Still
wary of the infiltration of “communist elements”, the elites saw these changes as too
dangerous and on October 21, 1944, director of the national police, a close ally of
Hernandez, executed a counter coup.
Real reform was stalled again during the regime of General Salvador Castaneda
Castro (1945-1948) who performed a give and take which became common in
Salvadoran government. In order to pacify the masses, he opened borders, promised a
restructuring of the military and police, and allowed several political parties to remain in
existence. At the same time, he reigned in these parties’ political capacities by taking
away civil liberties and delegitimizing figures deemed too outspoken or popular. These
diversionary tactics would be used by the next six presidents, including Carlos Humberto
Romero (1977-1979), the president in office at the start of the country’s civil war. Hugh
Byrne, author of El Salvador’s Civil War: A Study ofRevolution puts it concisely,
...at least from 1946 to 1979, the Salvadoran system was characterized by rigid control to
maintain order, repression against any threats to oligarchic rule in the countryside, and oscillation
between repression and concession in the cities and toward the working and middle classes.’
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Military coup d’etats that occurred in 1948 and 1960 were two more examples of the
ruling party’s reaction to governments that strayed from the conservative agenda:
maintenance of the status quo which kept land in the hands of a few families and limited
the political opportunities of leftist movements. Not even the superficial reforms, such as
Castaneda’s legalization of political parties incapacitated by his restrictions, made any
significant social impact and were almost immediately overturned by repressive military
juntas.

IV
The Rise of the Insurgency in El Salvador
The extreme economic disparities which originated in El Salvador in the 1800s
were perpetuated throughout the twentieth century as a result of the military’s position as
a protector of the oligarchy’s power. Despite the continual prohibition of leftist political
parties, the extreme poverty faced by the majority of the country’s population motivated
the persistence of underground leftist groups. The clandestine opposition did not have
widespread popular support, however. Writing during the 1960s, historian Alastair White
observed of the peasants that.
the vast majority make no connection between the existing political regime and their poverty,
and...the lack of any sign of rebellion, protest, or even much opposition voting since 1932 is not,
as is claimed in some left-wing writings, simply a matter of fear of a repetition of the holocaust
that occurred then. There is discontent, but it is vaguely focused on the rich or on landowners
rather than sharply focused against the govemment^^.

Alastair White, El Salvador, Nations ofthe Modern World (New York: Prager, 1973). 208
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By the beginning of the civil war in 1979 however, the revolutionaries had at their
disposal an “extended rear guard” consisting of hundreds of thousands of campesinos
involved in several popular mass organizations.
The continued inability or unwillingness of the government to enact reforms to
alleviate the country’s high rates of poverty and unemployment combined with the
introduction of liberation theology to Latin America had profound effects on the growth
of political consciousness and participation in El Salvador. The 1960 “Soccer War” was a
perfect example of the government’s neglectful attitude towards the country’s economic
needs. The military junta decided to invade Honduras without considering the disastrous
consequences. It spent roughly one-fifth of the country’s annual budget in 100 hours of
fighting and lost a trading partner that had imported $23 million worth of Salvadoran
goods. In addition, 100,000 Salvadorans, living in Honduras before the war, were
repatriated. In a country where a large percentage of fertile land remained in the hands of
a very small group of people, the majority of the returning citizens became landless.
53

unemployed campesinos.
These additional strains on the economy only worsened living conditions. During
the 1970s, “the poorest 20 percent of Salvadorans earned one-fiftieth of the country’s
«54

income, while the most comfortable 20 percent earned two-thirds.
peasants had become landless by 1975.
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Over 40% of these

This was in stark contrast to the prosperity of

El Salvador’s elite. In 1971, 38% of the country’s top 1,429 firms were in the control of
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the 36 largest landowners.^^ The oligarchy succeeded in maintaining its privilege for
almost a century but developments in Latin America, among them successful leftist
revolutions in Cuba, the developing Sandinista movement in Nicaragua, and most
importantly for El Salvador, the development of Liberation Theology, would unite
hundreds of thousands of revolutionaries and make this task much harder.
Liberation Theology caused the traditional alliance between the Latin American
church, military, and economic elite to be reexamined. Developed during Vatican II and
the 1968 meeting of the Latin American Episcopal Conference in Medellin, Colombia,
Liberation Theology was the product of the Latin American bishops’ desire to confront
the tremendous social and economic strain that they saw their parishoners facing. Its
“preferential option for the poor” came from a new reading of the Bible in which
liberation through Christ no longer applied only to the release of the soul towards heaven
but began to be interpreted also as a path of escape from the acute poverty and inhumane
conditions in which so many campesinos lived. The bishops that met in Medellin decided
that it was their duty, “to defend the rights of the oppressed” and “to denounce the unjust
»57

action of world powers that works against the self determination of weaker nations.’
Priests began promoting Christian Base Communities (CEBs), Bible study groups which
were designed to develop their own leadership. CEBs were intended to incorporate the
laity into the rituals of the church and propagated the idea that all Christians were equal
58

before God.
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In seven centers all across the country, 15,000 lay teachers and preachers were
trained during the 1970s.^^ While the influence of most of the clergy on the work of the
CEBs was strictly spiritual, the secular ramifications of Liberation Theology were
profound. Campesinos who had always been taught, “accept your lot here on earth
because your real reward will come in the hereafter” began to apply the new Biblical
message to their social situations. These peasants soon began to use their new
organizational skills and network of communities to call strikes, plan marches, and
mobilize large groups for demonstrations. By the late 70s, the influence of the new
Christian theology and the work of the CEBs had become such a threat to the oligarchy
60

that fliers surfaced proclaiming,“Be a Patriot! Kill a Priest!”.

While the “popular church”, the church organization formed by lay members that
was quickly developing a political life of its own, formed an important part of the
“extended revolutionary rear guard” in El Salvador in the countryside, a vital source of
urban revolutionary mobilization came from the National University.^’ Following an
international trend during the 60s and on the heels of the successful Cuban Revolution,
Marxist and Leninist thought spread among the faculty and student body of the
University of El Salvador. One of its most well known rectors, Fabio Castillo, was a
member of the Salvadoran Communist Party and promoted many of his colleagues within
the University. Speaking of one of the most important insurgent organizations, the Frente
Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional, historian Cynthia McClintock said, “The
birthplace of the revolutionary movements that were to compose the FMLN was the
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National University of El Salvador.

In 1972 the administration of Colonel Arturo

Molina (1972-1977) occupied the University and purged it of faculty, staff, and students
believed to have leftist leanings. In a 1975 demonstration against the extravagance of the
Miss Universe Pageant (on which the Salvadoran government spent $30 million, again
showing their indifference to its citizens’ poverty), at least fifteen students were killed
and dozens were injured when attacked by security forces. In protest of the
government’s extreme reaction, more than one hundred activists occupied the National
Cathedral for nearly a week. It was during this time that the Bloque Popular
Revolucionario^ (BPR, Popular Revolutionary Block) one of the most influential leftist
organizations in Salvadoran politics was formed. By the end of the 1970s, the
consequences of political repression manifested themselves by producing students and
professors who became an integral part of the insurgency.
In addition to the popular mobilization of campesinos and urban intellectuals, the
military component of the Salvadoran revolution evolved and unified into five PoliticalMilitary Organizations and with corresponding mass popular organizations aimed at
mobilizing large groups of supporters. While each group maintained distinct ideologies,
by the end of the decade they were united under the banner of the Frente Farabundo
Marti para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN, Farabundo Marti Front for National
Liberation). Despite this unity, encouraged mostly by the extreme repression and lack of
political representation in the Salvadoran government, it is important to examine each

62

" Cynthia McClintock, Revolutionaty Movements in Latin America: El Salvador’s FMLN and Peru's
Shining Path (Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace. 1998).

63

Tommie Sue Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador: Origins and Evolution (Boulder: Westview Press,
1982). 89

39

actor’s ideology individually as divergent rhetoric threatened the stability of this umbrella
organization.
The first of the OPMs, the Fuerzas Populares de Liberacion (FPL, Popular
Liberation Forces) emerged from a rift in the Salvadoran Communist Party (PCS). For
most of the 1970s, the PCS maintained that change could be affected in El Salvador
through a “bourgeois-democratic revolution.”^ It sought support fi’om progressive
military officers and members of the middle class. The party’s secretary general,
Cayetano Carpio, disagreed with this strategy. In 1970, Carpio left the party and formed
the FPL. This organization believed in a “people’s war” and focused heavily on achieving
reform through military struggle. In 1972 the FPL concentrated its efforts on building
popular support from the masses and by mid-1975 had formed the country’s largest mass
popular organization, the Bloque Popular Revolucionario (BPR, Popular Revolutionary
Bloc) with 80,000 — 100,000 members. This group’s key participants were students,
65

professors, and peasants who also believed in a military-led revolution.
The Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo (ERP, People’s Revolutionary Army)
materialized as El Salvador’s second 0PM in 1972. Founded by intellectuals and
university students who supported Liberation Theology, the group worked closely with
priests in the Salvadoran countryside. The organization also included previous members
of the Juventud Comunista (Communist Youth) and radicalized bourgeoisie.^^ The ERP
focused on building a military answer to the repressive regime in power. Its mass popular
organization, the Ligas Populares 28 de Febrero (28th of February Popular Leagues, LP64
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28), grew to have 10,000 members who were primarily university students and
intellectuals that sympathized with the ERP’s militarily focused theories ofrevolution.
The third OPM was created because of an internal dispute over the group’s
rhetoric. Poet Roque Dalton began advocating for less emphasis on military action and
more popular mobilization. The ERP saw Dalton as a threat to its stability and arrested
67

him, charging him with treason.

Dalton’s execution in 1975 led his supporters to form

the Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional (FARN, Armed Forces of National
Resistance). The FARN maintained its opposition to a revolution based solely on military
action but acknowledged the necessity of an armed group for protection from government
repression while it worked towards it goal of popular mobilization. It developed
relationships with reformist military officers and cultivated a strong support base in urban
laborers. The FARN was also one of the only groups in El Salvador to use kidnapping as
a strategy; the group added $40 million to its “war fund” in the 1970s.^^ The Frente de
Accidn Popular Unificada, the FARN’s mass popular organization, drew its support
originally from campesinos influenced directly by politicized priests working in the
69

countryside but expanded its membership by mobilizing labor unions.
By 1980, the FMLN consolidated the organization of the FPL, the ERP, the
FARN, the Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores Centroamericanos (PRTC,
Revolutionary Party of Central American Workers; the fifth and smallest OPM). The
PCS,finally frustrated by its inability to affect reform through legal or political channels,
joined as well. The political organizations were unified under the banner of the Frente
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Democratico Revolucionario (Democratic Revolutionary Front, FDR) and this
organization, together with the FMLN, protagonized the civil war while the Salvadoran
70

military fought desperately to maintain the status quo.
The number, high level of organization, and size of the OPMs and popular mass
organizations that emerged in the seventies demonstrate the profound changes that
occurred in El Salvador between the time that White made his conclusions about the non¬
existent political consciousness of the masses and the outbreak of civil war in 1979. By
,»71

1980, “the Salvadoran regime model that had operated since 1948 was in crisis,

The

example set by successful leftist movements in Latin America paired with Liberation
Theology’s radical message created an awareness which finally connected the extreme
poverty of the majority of Salvadorans to its government. For the FMLN, revolutionary
war became the only means of achieving the reforms that it desired. The conditions
created in the early 1900s — the institutionalization of the military-oligarchic alliance’s
political and economic hegemony and the resulting extreme political repression and
poverty - finally pushed the country to the brink of civil war.
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2
The Trajectory of Civil War in El Salvador and Colombia
In the same way that knowledge of how civil wars begin dictates the ways in
which peace should be negotiated, the trajectory of the war once it has begun is important
to analyzing the success or failure of negotiations. This chapter discusses important
events of both El Salvador and Colombia’s civil wars and further explores the differences
between each country’s histories which precipitate peace (in the case of El Salvador) or
impede it (in the case of Colombia). El Salvador’s story of revolution culminates in a
successfully negotiated peace process observed and implemented by a United Nations
peace keeping operation. Conflict continues to plague Colombia. Despite the divergent
contexts from which war arose in each country, in each case revolution was seen as a
means of implementing significant reforms — a task judged impossible through the
existing political process.

I
Civil War in El Salvador
The conditions that had been developing in El Salvador since the beginning of the
twentieth century finally pushed the country towards a crisis by the end of the 1970s.
Inequalities created by the institutionalization of the landed oligarchy, the establishment
of the military as protector of elite privilege, and the Salvadoran state’s unwillingness to
address the issue of agrarian reform and poverty fomented unrest in the majority of the
country’s impoverished campesinos. With the growing popularity of Liberation Theology
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in the Latin American Catholic Church in the late seventies, mobilization of the masses
became possible in a completely new way. By the end of the seventies, five politicalmilitary organizations had united as the Frente Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion and
together with the Frente Democrdtico Revolucionario was planning its next step in
achieving, “the conquest of power and the installation of a revolutionary democratic
government, which at the head of the people will undertake the construction of a new
72

society”.
While civil war was certainly on the horizon, the failure of a 1979 reformist coup
cemented the FMLN’s belief that their revolution was the only means of change. The
coup brought a junta of three civilians and two progressive members of the military to
power. The new executives included representatives from all political parties,
intellectuals from the Universidad Centroamericana, and progressive businessmen in
their administration. While the coup was originally conceived to include only young,
reformist members of the armed forces, two senior officers discovered the plot and
demanded they be included. Their presence, combined with opposition from the
oligarchy and more conservative members of the military, debilitated the new
government’s capacity to make changes.’^ While the junta attempted to develop agrarian
reforms and encourage a democratic opening of the political process, extreme
conservative elements of society embarked on a “dirty war” forming paramilitary groups,
led mainly by Major Roberto d’Aubuisson. D’Aubuisson encouraged the development of
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death squads in every sector of the country’s security forces and created civilian squads
as well.

74

Despite the promise of change that the coup of 1979 initially held, its legitimacy
in the eyes of the OPMs and mass popular organizations soon diminished as conservative
repression increased and the military members of the junta became more and more
powerful. The FMLN-FDR soon became convinced that the coup would not give them an
opportunity to affect their revolution politically and that change necessitated civil war.
On January 10, 1981, the FMLN launched what it called the “final offensive.” While the
insurgency believed that the military campaign, coupled with a popular revolution, would
topple the government quickly, in just a few months it had reached a stalemate with El
Salvador’s Armed Forces (ESAF). Over the next few years the advantage went back and
forth between the two parties. The weakness of the ESAF stemmed from their inability to
develop an appropriate strategy for fighting the guerrilla attacks being waged against it.
For the FMLN, its attempt to build a regular army during this time caused its
75

overextension.

During the rest of the 1980s, neither side managed to gain a definitive advantage
over its opponent. The Sandinista government in Nicaragua and Communist countries
around the world provided the FMLN much needed money, equipment, and training,
allowing it to continue its military campaigns. The ESAF was funded heavily by a U.S.
government intent on preventing “the take-over of the country by a Leninist-Castroite”
guerrilla army.^^ When Ronald Reagan came to office in 1981, he increased U.S. aid to
El Salvador from $64.5 million to $156 million. This figure rose to $302 million in 1982,
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a figure which included $80 million in military aid. The insurgents countered this influx
of money by focusing its military strategy on targets which would damage the country’s
economy. During this decade, a US embassy study reported that damage caused by the
77

FMLN reached as much as $598.6 million.

By the end of the decade, the two parties had reached a stalemate. Several
circumstances, both international and domestic, heightened the standoff and increased the
relevance of negotiations as an option to end the war. First, an aggressive offensive
launched by the FMLN in 1989, the largest of the war, showed both the Salvadoran
government and the U.S. that a military victory by the State was all but impossible. It
also, “had the effect of reinforcing the beliefs of some (Salvadoran) government and
business leaders that economic recovery and the maintenance of public support would
require a negotiated end to the conflict necessitating compromise and concessions on
both sides”. This growing pressure from the business class, combined with a swell of
public support from a population exhausted by poverty and instability that they came to
associate more with the war than an oppressive government, encouraged President
Alfredo Cristiani (1989 - 1994) to commit to negotiations,
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On an international level.

the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union had a powerful effect on both sides. The
end of the Cold War,combined with the defeat of the Sandinistas in the 1990 Nicaraguan
elections, meant the loss of important sources of support for the FMLN. Ironically, with
the threat of Communism waning in Latin America and the fall of the Communist
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superpower, the Salvadoran government also lost a significant amount of aid as the
United States no longer felt it necessary to ensure the defeat ofthe FMLN.
The military stalemate, deepened by the loss of external aid for both parties, the
decrease in both elite and popular support for the war, and the enthusiasm of the Cristiani
government to end the conflict, led both groups to agree to negotiations led by a UN
mediator. On April 4, 1990, the FMLN and the Salvadoran government signed the
Geneva Agreement which outlined the framework and objectives of the peace process.
For the next two years, the insurgents, government, and UN mediator met frequently to
discuss issues ranging from human rights verification, judicial and electoral reform, the
future role of the ESAF, and the legitimization of the FMLN as a political party. Two
major issues threatened the process during this time. The first was the issue of a cease¬
fire. The Salvadoran government wanted an immediate disarmament of rebel forces but
the FMLN maintained that its military was its only bargaining chip. The insurgents’
continued military offensives during 1990 and 1991 and newly acquired surface to air
missiles reminded the government that it would have to concede important points if the
war was to end. The second issue was the role of the ESAF. The FMLN wanted “the
phasing-out of both armies in a gradual, symmetrical and simultaneous process with the
formation of a new public security force of a civilian nature.

The ESAF,accustomed to

their institutionalized position in society, was more than reluctant to concede. In the end.
September 1991 agreements signed in New York called for the “purification,” reduction
of size, and reform of doctrine and training of the ESAF. The accords also created a new
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National Civilian Police force that would integrate former FMLN combatants. On
January 16, 1992, the two groups signed the final agreement for the end to the war in
Mexico.
The end to the Salvadoran civil war was precipitated by the convergence of
several important domestic and international factors. The military stalemate, the fall of
the Soviet Union and the Sandinista defeat, and the internal call for peace forced each
side to think seriously about negotiations to end the war. US support of the peace process
and the presence of an objective, third-party negotiator from the United Nations ensured
that the negotiations would not stall.

II
Civil War in Colombia
In the decades immediately following the insurgency’s emergence, Colombia’s
conflict can be characterized as low intensity warfare. Following a crushing defeat during
an ambitious maneuver to establish its presence in the coffee growing regions of the west,
the FARC decided to avoid any future “adventurist action” and returned to traditional
guerrilla strategy. For the next ten years, the group remained hidden in rural areas east of
the Cordillera Central. The group recruited, trained, and filled the void left by the lack of
state presence by installing its own mayors, police forces, and judicial systems. The
absence of guerrilla presence in urban areas and of major offensives against the state
caused the Colombian military to adopt a passive attitude. “For decades following La
Violencia, the insurgents remained largely “out there,” out of sight, out of mind, patiently
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building an alternative to society.

■>?82

The ELN, following Guevara’s

foco theory, was

intent on finding a rural area that was easily accessible by the urban high command.
Internal tensions in the ELN, including the tension which came from divisions between
the urban commanders and their rural support base, caused the group to be very
vulnerable. It suffered significant defeats, the largest of which occurred when its most
important column was decimated at Anori in Antioquia Department in 1973.

83

It was not until 1982 that the FARC decided to shift its emphasis from its political
goals to the consolidation of an Ejercito del Pueblo (People’s Army, EP - thus its new
acronym, the FARC-EP). At the Seventh Party Conference, the FARC set as its goal the
increase of its army by around 26,000 members and the establishment of 48 fronts. Due
to the discovery of petroleum in areas of ELN presence and the group’s increasing use of
extortion and strategic attacks on oil companies and pipelines, the group experienced an
increase in its resources and recruitment abilities. During the eighties, the aggressive
urban guerrilla group M-19 perpetrated the most impressive guerrilla attacks. The seizure
of the Dominican embassy in 1980 (during a banquet attended by the U.S. ambassador
and the papal nuncio) and the daring invasion of the Palacio de Justicia in 1985, brought
the reality of the war home to many urban elites.^"^ The rapid, heavy handed response of
the military to the M-19’s successes and its lack of a wide support base or funding caused
it to be so weakened that it demobilized at the end of the decade.
The increase in insurgent capabilities due to narcotrafficking profits and a change
in the nature of combat led to an escalation of violence during the late 1980s and
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throughout the 1990s. The FARC-EP made significant progress towards achieving its
1982 goals; by the beginning of the decade its army had grown to include almost 20,000
members on 60 fronts. Due to a process of “counter-reform” in which, “narcotraffickers
and their associates in organized crime...acquired more than 10 percent of the most
,,85

fertile lands in the country.

the interests and territories of traditional influence ofthe

FARC-EP suddenly came into conflict with the new illicit activities and investments. The
rural based guerrilla organization began taxing the drug lords’ products and running
protection for large landowners and campesinos alike. Revenues from these activities.
combined with ransom payments, earned the FARC between $60 million and $100
86

million a year.

The ELN also profited significantly from extortion of both

narcotraffickers and oil companies; it earned an estimated $150 million annually during
the nineties.
As a result of a surge in resources, the FARC-EP began a series of direct clashes
with government forces which took the Colombian military by surprise. The group also
developed a new strategy, the aim of which was to expel the state from large areas in
order to establish itself as the de facto power.*^ The FARC-EP did this militarily but also
found that, acting as an alternative to the violent and extortive presence of the
narcotraffickers made it possible to build a large support base. It is estimated that coca
88

cultivation provides a crucial source of income for more than one million peasants.
The guerrilla group emerged as this group’s protector, forcing drug lords to pay peasants
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market price for coca leaves and regulating everything from alcohol consumption to
domestic abuse in marginalized areas of colonization where the state had no real
presence.
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The intensification of violence perpetrated by insurgent groups rejuvenated by a
surge in profit and support combined with the failure of Andres Pastrana’s peace talks (to
be discussed further in the next chapter) led the Colombian public to call for a hard-lined.
military response. The administration of Alvaro Uribe Velez(2002- present) heeded this
call but, to date, his success is questionable. Despite the considerable U.S. aid the
Colombian military has at its disposal(The U.S. contributed $1 billion in 2000 alone and
has given, to date and including funds spent by the US Agency for International
Development (USAID), $7.7 billion dollars), it has been unable to make any real
headway in defeating the guerrilla militarily.^® Plan Patriota, an ambitious counter
insurgency operation which began in 2002 has been unable to kill or capture a single
member of the FARC-EP’s high command.
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Despite the successful demobilization of

27,000 members of the AUC,negotiations with the FARC-EP have stalled repeatedly.
The situation in Colombia seems to be at a deadlock in which each side believes it
can win what is, currently, an un-winnable war. The Colombian military’s lack of
organization, ability, and willingness to respond to the insurgency in its first few years of
existence allowed the FARC-EP and ELN to build their support bases and strategy in the
countryside. The spectacular profits from narcotrafficking, an industry which will not be
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defeated easily, provided the country’s oldest and strongest guerrilla group, the FARCEP, the ability to finance a new wave of fighting supported by a disenfranchised
population dependent upon coca cultivation. The lack of military success during the
administration of Alvaro Uribe leads one to wonder if Colombia’s war can be won on the
battlefield.
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3
El Salvador’s Lessons and Colombia’s Challenges: On the Possibilities
of Peace
The origins and context of the civil wars in El Salvador and Colombia differ
greatly. The most important dissimilarity, and the one that motivated the analysis and
conclusions of this work, is the peaceful settlement of the Salvadoran conflict with the
help of a United Nations peacekeeping mission. Requested by both the insurgency and
the state, the mission was one of the first post-Cold War instances of intervention in an
internal conflict. Indicative of an evolution in UN peacekeeping, the operation was
unprecedented both in its nature and the success it achieved. UN Secretary-General
Boutros Boutros-Ghali commented: “It is no exaggeration to say that, taken together, and
given their breadth and scope, these agreements constitute a prescription for a revolution
achieved by negotiation.
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Recent literature on peacekeeping suggests that a similar

remedy can be prescribed to a variety of patients with equal success. The case of
Colombia, and the failure of a negotiated end to its civil war, contradicts this idea.
However, some aspects of the Salvadoran process remain relevant and provide important
lessons about how to proceed. This chapter explores those aspects and then discusses the
barriers to peace specific to Colombia.
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I
El Salvador’s Lessons
El Salvador’s twelve year civil war officially ended in January 1992 with the
signing of the Chapultepec Peace Accords in Mexico City. The cease-fire brought an end
to violence that involved 12,300 FMLN combatants, claimed an estimated 75,000 lives,
and displaced more than a million people.^^ Observed and implemented by an
unprecedented United Nations peacekeeping mission, “most analysts consider El
Salvador’s transition from civil war to peace among the most successful implementations
»94

of a peace agreement in the post-Cold War period,

Between May 1991 and April 1995,

the United Nations Peace Keeping Mission to El Salvador(ONUSAL)negotiated not just
peace but profound changes in the country’s institutions.
Several things stand out about ONUSAL that are relevant for Colombia. In one of
its first opportunities after the Cold War, the UN took the opportunity to demonstrate its
flexibility and evolving mandate in peace missions, two things that will be necessary for
the development of sustainable peace in Colombia. The deployment of UN observers and
human rights verifiers before a cease-fire was achieved in El Salvador signaled a
commitment that went beyond the will of the negotiating parties. This dedication to peace
continued throughout the process as the UN held each party accountable for upholding
conditions defined in the accords when the Salvadoran government or FMLN later
attempted to renegotiate.^^ In its unflinching role as a third-party guarantor, ONUSAL
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provided a frank assessment of the state of implementation of the accords, which
apparently embarrassed the government into taking its commitments more seriously.
increased donors’ pressure for compliance, and demonstrated the moral and political
«96

influence of the UN’s verification judgments.

While the UN’s mandate originated

from the request of both the FMLN and the Salvadoran conflict, the organization made it
clear that it was committed to negotiating peace regardless of either party’s willingness to
implement a specific accord once tlie process was underway.
Another element of the UN mission in El Salvador that is relevant for Colombia is
the way in which its expanded mandate influenced the essence of the peace process in El
Salvador. The underlying goal of UN involvement in negotiations became “to recreate
state institutions so as to legitimize and confer credibility on democracy and its rules; in
other words, to establish a true rule of law.”^^ ONUSAL was committed to building a
sustainable peace through institution building. In that vein, the mission’s mandate was
extended twice, first to allow for the creation of the Joint Group for the Investigation of
Politically Motivated Illegal Armed Groups in December 1993 and later to expand its
capabilities to observe the 1994 elections. Each was intended to allow enough safe
political space for elections that the FMLN, the government, and the Salvadoran people
would see them as legitimate. After the 1994 elections, when international donors
pressured a decrease in ONUSAL activities, the mission did not leave but rather
downgraded to the United Nations Mission in El Salvador(MINUSAL) to continue to
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verify the implementation of peace accords and maintain an accurate flow of information
98

between all parties.

Just as the pre-cease fire human rights verification established the UN’s
commitment to building a sustainable peace, the creation of commissions to investigate
human rights abuses generated an atmosphere of reconciliation between the FMLN,the
government, and the Salvadoran people. The Truth Commission and Ad Hoc
Commissions in charge of this task were responsible for, “the most thorough
housecleaning ever carried out of a Latin American military not defeated in war” and
recommended the removal of the minister and vice minister of defense, most of the
generals, and 102 officers. These purges, along with other radical reforms which
included reducing the military’s size from 60,000 to 6,000 members, initiated profound
changes in a society previously controlled by the institutionalized power of the military.
By the end of ONUSAL and MINUSAL’s missions, the 12,000 member FMLN
had been demobilized and reintegrated into society. By 2000, the FMLN’s political party
had won mayoral positions in the country’s largest cities, including its capital San
100

Salvador.

The military never reasserted itself as a hegemonic political power and, for

the most part, has accepted its newly defined role as defender of, “the sovereignty of the
101

State and the integrity of its territory”.

While El Salvador still suffers from high

poverty and crime rates, the goal of ONUSAL, to negotiate a sustainable peace, was
accomplished.
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The UN mission’s commitment must be duplicated in Colombian negotiations. Its
dedication to institution building will be cmcial in a country that historically has had very
little state presence in rural areas. Human rights and election observation will also be
necessary in ensuring that a future political manifestation of the FARC-EP will not find
itself in the midst of a massacre like the one that annihilated the Union Patriotica in the
1980s. Despite the different origins and context of El Salvador’s civil war, the country’s
negotiated peace does, in fact, provide many lessons for Colombia.

II
Colombia’s Challenges to Peace: The Failure of Previous
Negotiations
The successful termination of the Salvadoran conflict and recent literature
suggests that a UN peacekeeping mission would be a viable means of bringing peace to
Colombia. There are, however, several complicating factors unique to the country which,
currently, rule out the possibility of a negotiated peace. Beginning with President
Belisario Betancur (1982-1986), the search for such a peace has been at least a nominal
plank in the platforms of all the country’s subsequent presidents. The failure of these
attempts signals the lack of willingness on the part of both the insurgency and the state to
fully commit to the peace process. The failure of negotiations in the 1990s demonstrates
the current deadlock in which neither side believes it can be defeated (and so has no real
motivation to lay down its arms). The developments which led to this deadlock - the rise
of narcotrafficking, the military failure of the state, and the effect of US aid - are also
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discussed in this section. These factors provide an important contrast to the precipitous
conditions which materialized in El Salvador to facilitate its peace process.
The failure of previous attempts to successfully negotiate Colombia’s conflict is
evidence of the lack of objective conditions precipitous for peace. A brief look at this
history is important in understanding the specific challenges a peace mission would face
in Colombia. President Belisario Betancur’s place in history, as well as the failure of his
initiatives, can paradoxically be attributed to the same thing: his unprecedented
commitment to peace. Taking office with ambitious goals, Betancur immediately offered
a general amnesty to insurgents and established a bi-partisan Peace Commission. The
president also pledged his support to the Central American Contadora Peace Process and
the contingent of Cold War non-aligned countries. In 1984 he signed the La Uribe
Accords with the FARC-EP, the EPL (a small, Maoist guerrilla group that believed in a
“prolonged popular war”), and the urban insurgent group the M-19 declaring a
102

ceasefire.

Despite this success, Betancur’s radical efforts earned him the suspicion of

the military and political elite who believed the President to be a communist sympathizer.
As a result he “never accomplished the unification of the establishment around his peace
„103

policies.

The ceasefire soon fell apart as violence between the military and guerrilla

groups broke out once more.
Although many of Betancur’s objectives fell by the wayside, not the least of
which was his goal of ending the conflict, the “democratic opening” associated with his
administration had lasting effects. In 1985, the FARC-EP created the Union Patriotica
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(Patriotic Union, UP), a political party whose goal was to open up an alternative route to
political participation for all leftists in Colombian society. In the FARC-EP’s eyes, the
UP would also be an alternative to the bipartisanship exercised by the liberal and
104

conservative parties which previously left no political space for opposition,

To the

country’s elite, however, the UP was yet another sign of the government’s weakness and
the creation of the political arm of an illegal group. During the rest of the eighties and
into the early nineties, the UP was met with an onslaught of political violence. An
estimated 3000 members of the party were killed, including two presidential
105

candidates.

The spectacular failure of the FARC-EP’s integration into the Colombian
106

political system would serve as a major impediment to future negotiations,

This,

combined with the occupation of the Palace of Justice by the M-19 in 1985 which led to
the deaths of 11 of 24 Supreme Court judges, allowed the destruction of the peace
107

process and a renewed faith in the military option for both the state and the insurgency.
The search for a solution to the country’s civil conflict continued to be a key issue
for Colombia’s presidents in the 1990s. Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994) failed in negotiations
with the country’s largest guerrilla groups but managed to engineer the demobilization
and reintegration of combatants from the Corriente de Renovacion Socialista, a faction of
the ELN. His successor, Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) made ambitious pronouncements
about his intentions to obtain peace during his campaign but was almost immediately
hindered by allegations of his involvement with narcotraffickers. The release of the
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narcocasetes, tapes which implicated the president in accepting money from the Cali
Cartel, and Samper’s subsequent impeachment trial, stripped him of legitimacy in the
eyes of the guerrillas. Samper’s subsequent war on drugs, a gesture undertaken to prove
his commitment to fighting the rapidly growing problem, became the main focus of the
remaining years of his presidency.
When Andres Pastrana (1998 - 2002) came to office, violence had escalated
between the FARC, ELN, and paramilitaries. Kidnapping rates were at an all time high;
108

in 1998 an average of six Colombian citizens were kidnapped a day.

Colombian civil

society showed its desire for an end to the conflict with the Mandate Para La Paz
(Mandate for Peace) that was included on the 1997 ballot for local and regional offices.
The “yes” vote of nearly ten million was a clear signal that Colombian citizens were fed
up with the fighting.*®^ During his campaign,

Pastrana announced that he had met

secretly with the FARC’s highest in command, Manuel Marulanda (also known as
Tirofijo). This meeting was one of several to come, not just with the FARC but also the
ELN, and showed the willingness of the guerrillas to negotiate now that Samper had left
office. In an effort to capitalize on this willingness, Pastrana agreed to a zona de despeje,
a demilitarized zone of five municipalities in which the FARC could organize itself for
the peace talks without fear of government military action. This was, by far, the most
controversial element of Pastrana’s peace plan. As a result, the Colombian minister of
110

defense, Rodrigo Lloreda resigned along with 14 generals and 200 officers.
Meanwhile, violence in the countryside increased. As the FARC continued attacks on
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rural villages, the AUC responded forcefully. Attacks on the armed forces also rose to
more than 300 between 1998 and 1999.
Despite a series of negotiations between the government and guerrilla groups, the
rising level of violence in the country was impossible for Pastrana to ignore.
Acknowledging that the increasingly important role that narcotrafficking played in the
conflict, Pastrana requested a sort of “Marshall Plan” for Colombia. The resulting aid
package, unveiled in 1999, was Plan Colombia. The implementation of Plan Colombia
adversely affected negotiations; $1.3 billion was to be contributed by the United States,
111

the majority of which was directed towards the military’s war on coca.

The US-led

military fortification did little to encourage insurgents to decrease their military
offensives. Pastrana’s peace process was destined for what would become a familiar
deadlock: insurgents refused to negotiate until the government army agreed to a ceasefire,
and even as talks took place, paramilitary activities increased. The guerrillas, viewing the
paramilitaries as an extension of State sponsored violence insurgents refused to continue
negotiations. Pastrana left office in 2002 having accomplished very little in the way of a
peace process. His legacy would be a shift in Colombian opinion. A far cry from
Mandato Para La Paz, Colombians had become frustrated by a series of fruitless
negotiations and escalating violence and popular support was growing for a leader that
would restore some semblance of order to the country.
Alvaro Uribe Velez’s (2002 - present) doctrine of “democratic security,” a
hawkish approach to reducing the violence in Colombia, has been successful in some
respects. His approach to confronting the country’s violence, which has led to a 73% drop
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in kidnapping rates, earned him popularity rates at or above 70% during all four years of
his first term and led to support for a Constitutional amendment which allowed his
112

reelection in 2006.

Uribe accomplished a historical step towards Colombian peace; he

achieved a ceasefire agreement with the AUC and has, to date, demobilized 27,000
members. In 2006, for the first time ever, Colombians cited the economy (and not
security) as their primary concern. Despite this success, the FARC-EP remains strong and
entrenched in the countryside; while attacks on the government perpetrated by the group
have been reduced significantly from the highest levels (close to 500 in 2002), the group
113

initiated military action more than 350 times in 2005.

Ill
Recent Developments: Narcotrafficking and the Failure of Uribe’s
Democratic Security Initiative
While the resolution of the conflict in El Salvador was precipitated by a military
stalemate due, in large part, to the lack of each party’s financing at the end of the Cold
War, the impasse in Colombia is caused by the opposite problem. The country’s
insurgent groups have seemingly infinite sources of wealth due to their involvement in
narcotrafficking. According to the Colombian Department of National Planning, the
FARC and the ELN extracted around $600'million in protection rents from
narcotraffickers in 1996 and estimates of subsequent FARC profit are as high as $500
million dollars a year. The AUC’s annual budget is estimated at between $80 and $100
112
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million dollars; 70% of which, according to leader Carlos Castano, derives from extortion
114

of or direct participation in narcotrafficking.
In addition to the resources that narcotrafficking provides the country’s insurgent
groups, it has given them a new source of popular support, particularly in the case of the
FARC-EP. It is estimated that coca cultivation provides a crucial source of income for
more than one million peasants. While the Gini Index of Colombia’s cities fell from 0.30
to 0.25 between 1973 andl995, it remained stable at 0.34 in rural areas, leading one to
believe that the FARC-EP and coca cultivation do a better job of ensuring income
115

inequality than the government does in its cities.

The economic security that illicit

cultivation provides is augmented by the guerrilla organization’s ability to establish order
in small towns. The guerrillas fill a void left by the State by policing towns and imposing
laws which regulate everything from fishing and hunting to domestic abuse and liquor
consumption. They ensure that peasants get fair prices for their product by forcing
116

narcotraffickers to pay market value for coca leaves.

One final reason for the

increasing popular support of the FARC is due to the process of“counter-reform” during
the late 1990s. During just a few years the narcotrafficking cartels managed to buy up an
117

estimated 10% of the country’s fertile land.

The FARC-EPs old claims for land reform

became relevant again during this period.
Civil war literature which analyzes the economic dimensions of conflict indicates
that the presence of easily lootable resources like coca lead to the protraction of the
conflict and the failure of peace processes. As Jack Hirschleifer and Todd Sandler argue.
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civil wars are a basic cost-benefit analysis in which combatants make decisions based on
118

the rents they can extract during war time versus those available during peace time.

As

Collier explains in his analysis of rebellions as “quasi-criminal activity,” in which
Victory over the government is not an objective, and so conflict is treated as equilibrium
„119

phenomenon.

Recent works on civil wars motivated by greed and grievance arrive at

similar conclusions about the connection between the protraction of war and the benefits
120

perceived by parties involved.

Richani posits the existence of a positive political

economy in Colombia in which war is much more profitable than peace. These
theoretical analyses of the capacity of resources to prolong war are confirmed by the case
of Colombia. The total annual cost of four or more attacks on military bases by the
FARC-EP averages $4 million and the maintenance of an 18,000 member force (which
includes ammunitions, armament, and logistical support) would be between $80 and $100
million. With FARC profits anywhere from $300 to $500 million, continuation of the war
121

is more than feasible for them.

If the protraction of the conflict in Colombia is due, in large part, to the presence
of an easily lootable resource in the form of coca, it is worthwhile to examine the
Colombian government’s ability to eradicate cultivation. The largest offensive in the
country’s “war on drugs” began with the Plan Colombia. The plan was created to be a
complex aid packaged aimed at improving Colombia’s economy, increasing the strength
of its institutions, combating narcotrafficking, and ending the conflict. It called for
118
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economic assistance from a number of countries, but when the European contingent
never materialized, the United States became the program’s main sponsor. The U.S.
contributed $1 billion in 2000 alone and has given, to date and including funds spent by
the US Agency for International Development (USAID), $7.7 billion dollars. The
majority of this money is used militarily with only, “a residual amount...assigned to
122

alternative development and social problems”.

While drug interdiction and aerial fumigation did reduce cultivation during the
Plan’s first few years, it increased by 6,000 hectares in 2005 (ending a four year decline)
and remains 20,000 hectares higher than the average amount cultivated in the nineties.
123

the decade which saw a boom in FARC forces and armament.

Fumigation’s

inefficiency stems from the ease and speed with which it can be replanted and the crop’s
124

huge profit margins.

Mark Peceny and Michael Duman argue that,“the strengthening

of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) during the 1990s was an
125

unintended consequence of a series of tactical successes in U.S. anti-drug policies.
They contend that the dismantling of the Medellin and Cali cartels left narcotrafficking
territories and networks open for the FARC and that drug interdiction led traffickers to
move cultivation to Colombia rather than risk transportation from Peru or Bolivia. By the
end of the 1990s, the most aggressive decade for Colombian counter-narcotics, the FARC
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had doubled its forces and 75% of the region’s coca was grown in the country.

The

case of Colombia also appears to support the analysis of Fearon, which states that thirdparty aid which manipulates only the structural balance of capabilities prolongs rather
than decreases the duration of conflicts. In his statistical study, diplomatic interventions
were the only type of international involvement which shortened the length of civil
127

wars.

As a result of the Colombian government’s inability to decrease coca cultivation.
it has also been unable to defeat the guerrilla militarily. Just as in previous
administrations, negotiations conducted by the government have failed. While
Uribe has had substantial success in demobilizing the AUC,these demobilizations were
not, the product of intensive talks which addressed the group’s fundamental grievances.
Therefore, they were not the product of a process conducive to a sustainable peace. This
achievement may have been due to the fact that “while the FARC is still largely an
insurgent organization that engages in criminal activity to advance its political agenda,
»128

the AUC represents a fusion of paramilitary and criminal organizations

and thus is

more willing to disarm without a comprehensive set of accords. Demobilization of the
FARC-EP will require an intensive UN led peace process to consolidate a lasting peace in
Colombia.
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Epilogue
The conflict in Colombia is at a deadlock; thus far the government has been
unable to defeat the insurgents either militarily or economically, while the only victory
the insurgents can claim is their survival in the face of an aggressive new military
strategy undertaken by President Uribe. With the US funding the state military and
narcotrafficking rents supporting the guerrillas, neither side will gain a definitive
advantage over the other anytime soon and each still firmly believes it has the ability to
continue fighting. The United States’ Congress agreed to send roughly $430 million
dollars in military and economic aid to the country in 2006 and this partnership will
continue for the duration of George W. Bush’s term in office. On the part of the
insurgents, coca cultivation has become the source of support for hundreds of thousands
of peasants and no alternative crop even approaches the profit it provides, ensuring that it
will continue to be a problem in the country and a source of funding for illegal armed
groups for many years to come.
The peace accords in El Salvador did not address all of the FMLN’s concerns for
social and cultural reform, but the restructuring of important institutions assured that
these changes could be pursued in the political arena. Colombia, a country where the
same assurance does not exist for the FARC-EP, would benefit from the same types of
institutional reform affected under ONUSAL. While political participation in Colombia
has increased in the country due to the 1991 Constitution, Alvaro Uribe’s democratic
security strategy has won him high approval ratings and a reelection in 2006. This
strategy, a militaristic approach to defeating the guerrilla, limits political space for leftists
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from parties such as the Polo Democrdtico Alternativo which won only 17 seats in the
country’s legislature in 2006.
***

A United Nations Peacekeeping operation is the best option for ending the
conflict in Colombia but is not currently a possibility for the country. The literature
overwhelmingly concludes that third-party intervention is crucial to negotiated conflict
129

settlement and the case of El Salvador seems to prove that conclusion.

However, an

analysis of the historical conditions present at the time of the negotiations demonstrates
that peace was not solely a product of ONUSAL’s involvement. The end ofthe Cold War
and the subsequent cessation of funds provided to each side created a negative stalemate
in which each side conceded that it could not defeat the other.
It remains true, however, that no internal actor in the war can make credible
promises to the others without outside monitoring and enforcement of the implementation
of accords. Less than a month prior to the completion of this thesis, five mayors were
detained for alleged ties with paramilitaries - yet another reason for the insurgents to be
130

distrustful of state-led negotiation.

For the government’s part, violence continues to

plague the country - the April 9th bombing of a military college in Bogota and the April
13*^ attack on police headquarters in Cali have served only to strengthen President
131

Uribe’s military resolve.

Additionally, the United States’ failure to terminate hostilities
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stems from the fact that the aid it provides only affects the balance of power, one of the
132

main causes of conflict protraction.
Despite the discouraging outlook for Colombian peace and given the failure of
Colombian-led negotiation, a United Nations peacekeeping operation is the only option
for achieving peace in Colombia. No other international actor has the capability.
resources, or willingness to implement the type of multidimensional peacekeeping
process that Colombia requires. The United Nations successfully performed several roles
in El Salvador that will be important elements of a Colombian peace. Investigation and
prosecution of human rights abuses by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the
Ad Hoc Commission in El Salvador contributed greatly to healing deep wounds created
by the conflict and will be extremely beneficial for Colombia. In addition, incorporation
of FARC-EP combatants into the national military and police forces, completed
successfully in El Salvador with the FMLN, will be an important step in reassuring the
country’s largest guerrilla organization that disarmament will not mean its annihilation.
Judicial reform and strengthening of the State can be supported by the United Nations as
well, two key elements in fighting the criminal activities of illegal organizations which
both benefit from and contribute to the State’s weakness in large areas of the country.
Finally, just as it did in El Salvador, the UN can encourage incorporation of ex
combatants in the political process by providing protection for candidates (effectively
quelling fears of another UP-like massacre).
What remains to be seen, and really the most fundamental question for Colombia,
is if the United Nations can undertake a comprehensive counter-narcotics program. The
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only real advances in the war on drugs must be made hand in hand with economic and
social development. The State must be strengthened in areas where the FARC-EP has
implemented its “state making capabilities” and hundreds of thousands of peasants will
have to be compensated or convinced of the benefits of the legality of alternative crops.
Ex-combatants must be reintegrated into society in a way which deters participation in
narcotrafficking and supports sustainable, legal involvement in society. The UN has been
successful with reintegration programs in the past but rarely in situations where illicit
profits were so high. In addition to measures aimed at preventing guerrilla and peasant
participation in the illegal economy, government involvement in narcotrafficking must be
investigated aggressively.
The United Nations proved in El Salvador that it is capable of undertaking a
flexible, multi-dimensional, intensely committed peacekeeping operation xmlike ever
before. It has the economic resources and international backing to make it successful in
ways that a smaller organization or independent country cannot be. These things, coupled
with a UN peacekeeping mission’s capability and experience in performing functions
which are crucial to conflict resolution make it the only option for achieving a sustainable
peace in Colombia. The important conclusion of this thesis is, however, that the UN
option is not relevant at present given the Colombian conflict’s developments in the
1980s and 1990s and the country’s present day deadlock. Narcotrafficking and US aid
provide each side with the confidence that it will succeed and, in turn, eliminate any will
to negotiate.
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